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Abstract
IoT promises a new era of connectivity that goes beyond laptops and smart connected devices to connected
vehicles, smart homes, smart cities and connected healthcare. The huge volume of data that is collected
from millions of IoT devices raises information security and privacy concerns for users. This paper presents
a new scalable encryption technique, called Flexible encryption Technique (FlexenTech), to protect IoT data
during storage and in transit. FlexenTech is suitable for resource constrained devices and networks. It offers
a low encryption time, defends against common attacks such as replay attacks and defines a configurable
mode, where any number of rounds or key sizes may be used. Experimental analysis of FlexenTech shows
its robustness in terms of its multiple configurable confidentiality levels by allowing various configurations.
This configurability provides several advantages for resource constrained devices, including reducing the
encryption computation time by up to 9.7% when compared to its best rivals in the literature.
Keywords: Internet of Things, Encryption, Security.
1. Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT) is a set of perceptible connected devices capable of interacting with each
other. A thing refers to any device connected to the physical and digital world over the Internet [1].
These things progressively compose an embedded system that serves several real world environments like
healthcare and intelligent transport. IoT devices embrace physical objects via digital actuators, RFID
tags, sensors and communication units. IoT devices are often characterized by ultra-low bandwidth and
limited computation and communication capabilities. As shown in Figure 1, most of the IoT scenarios are
looking to connect with everything and everyone in order to share information [2]. With the huge number
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Figure 1: A comprehensive vision of the IoT architecture.
of connected entities the network traffic as well as the storage capacity will increase in an exponential
way. This introduces critical security challenges since efficient encryption, e.g., public key infrastructure,
will not operate reliably. These limitations render IoT devices prone to a wide range of attacks. Cloud
computing offers a solution to overcome the resource constraints of IoT devices. Furthermore, offloading
data and outsourcing computational tasks to the cloud presents new security and privacy concerns. The
amount of private information generated by IoT devices intensifies the security and privacy challenges in
cloud-enabled IoT networks. As the adoption of IoT grows, the cost-benefit of designing rigorous protocols
will become a major research subject with great impact. Hence, IoT applications cope with many challenges,
particularly the difficulties related to privacy and security issues [3]. These challenges include low resource
availability issues, vulnerability problems due to the nature of wireless communication, and low-power
computation resources. These constraints explain the difficulty of developing the necessary protocols for
the management and protection of these networks, such as routing and security protocols[4]. Like the other
types of network architectures, security is one of the most challenging requirements in IoT networks [5] which
includes mainly data confidentiality, data integrity, authentication, availability, and data freshness. Any
adapted IoT architecture and its standard protocols must consider essential restrictions such as dynamicity,
reliability, scalability, etc., and the information exchanged between IoT devices and the cloud must be
encrypted with adequate security prior to transmission.





















Figure 2: A Lightweight Cryptography Taxonomy.
are designed for resource-rich devices on high bandwidth networks. To address this issue, we propose
a lightweight block cipher that consumes fewer resources and reduces encryption overhead by realising:
smaller block size, smaller key length, lower computational complexity and simple key generation. Such a
cipher depends on the specifically used hardware technology and coding style which are useful to provide
an accurate IoT application. The critical issues that must be addressed in this cipher are: how to secure
inter-device and device-to-cloud communications, how to ensure the security and confidentiality of various
network entities, and what are the techniques adopted for authentication, access control and other security
features?
2. Background and related work
This section aims to present an overview of lightweight cryptography techniques and to discuss some
existing work. The proposed lightweight cryptography techniques will be explained depending on their
characteristics.
2.1. A taxonomy of lightweight cryptography techniques
The main characteristics of lightweight cryptography are low-cost, performance and applicable security
level. An optimal lightweight cryptography has to achieve a good balance between security level, computation
time and power consumption.
Regarding these characteristics, we can classify the previous work in lightweight cryptography into three
main classes: physical primitives, computational primitives and ultra lightweight protocols as shown in
Figure 2.
2.1.1. Physical primitives
The main principle of physical primitives is the use of bio-metrics for authentication. A physical primitive
can extend an analogue singularity or variation in physical features, which is essential to physical structures
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but excessively hard to duplicate, and translate it into a digital value for the determination of a specific
quantification. Physical layer protocols are designed with the aim to minimise power consumption without
compromising the fidelity. Power consumption should be linearly scaled as a function of data rate [6].
In [7], the authors describe Physical One-Way Functions (POWF) which focus on measuring the accuracy
of sprinkling outlines of noticeable laser energy. This approach provides a low implementation cost, but it
is not an appropriate low-cost explanation for radio-frequency identification (RFID) because if one delay is
consistently greater than another across chips, then the response will always be the same.
Other authors, e.g., [8], used POWF in their work to decrease the cost of implementation but it reduces
the performance.
2.1.2. Computational primitives
In computational primitives, the system security relies on the complexity in term of computation. These
approaches provide complicated mathematical solutions with high security level. In particular, asymmet-
ric cryptographic primitives have been approved as a strong solution to protect the data or secure the
communication since every primitive has been considered a secure entity [9]. In asymmetric cryptography,
computational primitives exploit the basics of modular arithmetic to attain Shannon’s philosophies of con-
fusion and diffusion [10] with expending basic mathematical and logical processes. In [11, 12, 13, 14], hash
functions and symmetric cryptography schemes are presented. The main shortfalls of these approaches are
the use of large keys, high complexity and energy consumption assigned to the computation process. In
addition, these approaches have not been investigated by public examination to experiment the security
aspect.
2.1.3. Ultra Lightweight Protocols
Ultra lightweight refers to those security approaches that use simple logic operations such as exclusive-
or (XOR) for their application [15, 16]. These kinds of techniques become popular and more adaptive
through RFID technologies. Indeed, their security aspect can provide the main services of the security
resistant. These schemes focus on a set of applied assumptions, where the attacker will not have the facility
to compute and generate the key. However, some of them consider that the attacker can read the tag for a
too limited time slot. Ultra lightweight primitives can be classified into one-time pads, as in [17, 18], which
are based on pseudonyms, re-encryption [14] and configured passwords [19].
As a result, secret keys are no longer essential to be securely stored in the memory of physical primitives.
These techniques usually reduce the cost of implementation, as well as the security performance. The
focus of computational primitives on complicated mathematical solutions makes them suffer from a security
problem, in particular from key moving between the sender and receiver. A well designed technique may
render them more popular and adaptive for low-end connected devices.
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2.2. Related work
Numerous research works have been recently carried out to provide encryption techniques pertinent
to the IoT context. They address the inherent resource limitations of IoT devices that make it difficult
to apply conventional encryption algorithms that require a significant amount of resources for their opera-
tion [20]. Several researchers cope with the resource limitation challenge by proposing lightweight encryption
techniques to provide efficient and secure communication with reasonable resource utilisation. A number of
researchers devised techniques to optimise existing conventional block ciphers for IoT devices. Some of them
have improved the performance of block ciphers by utilising smaller key sizes [21], reducing the number of
encryption rounds [22] and using smaller block sizes [23].
Other researchers focused on key management and authentication challenges in IoT environments [24].
The vast majority of this research focuses on symmetric-based algorithms. For example, Beaulieu et al. [25]
proposed Simon and Speck which are lightweight block ciphers with a variety of block and key sizes. The
work in [26] proposed a model which uses parallel computation to enhance the performance of the block
cipher algorithm. This model has been designed to consume lower energy and reduce hardware complexity.
The SIT algorithm proposed in [27] focuses on a hybrid Feistel and substitution-permutation network (SPN)
architecture. It is a mixture that uses the advantages of both approaches to develop a lightweight algorithm
that provides substantial security while maintaining the computation complexity at a reasonable level in
an IoT environment. The symmetric encryption scheme proposed by [28] uses multiple chaotic dynamical
systems for the IoT domain. This technique maintains the dynamic key update with each input data
block to provide higher levels of randomness. The authors in [29] present an experimental configuration
of a fractional-chaos based-cryptosystem for an IoT-based architecture in ad hoc networks under the IEEE
802.15.4 standard. The solution benefits from the characteristics of the fractional-order derivative operator
for encryption schemes to provide secure communications.
Lightweight asymmetric based solutions may provide stronger security than symmetric ciphers. However,
asymmetric solutions are not highly scalable and often have higher computation complexity which renders
them unsuitable for IoT environments [28]. Recently, several studies such as Identity-Based Encryption
(IBE) [30, 31] have been published which combine user’s identity with series of attributes to encrypt data
while enforcing a secure access policy. Furthermore, the decryption is carried out when authorized users with
the desired attributes satisfy a threshold access control policy. In [15], the authors proposed a lightweight
IBE scheme by using pre-computation techniques to reduce the computation cost of constrained devices.
They designed a lookup table, which obtains a pre-computed set of pairs generated using elliptic curve
cryptography in order to be used later to carry out cryptographic operations at low computational cost.
To overcome the expensive bilinear pairing computations, the authors in [16] proposed a lightweight no-
pairing IBE scheme based on elliptic curve cryptography by replacing pairing operations with point scalar
multiplication.
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In [32], the authors proposed a lightweight encryption scheme for smart homes. This scheme provides
users and smart objects a secure service at the lowest computation and communication costs. The proposed
solution relies on identity-based encryption to support flexible public key management, which does not
require complex certificate handling.
Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) provides the necessary flexibility required to manage a large number
of IoT devices and fine-grained access control, which is very much suited to secure data transmission,
storage and sharing in cloud-based IoT systems. The authors in [15, 33] give background information on
the Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE) and pre-computation techniques in an efficient
and secure way, and then describe the extended ABE scheme proposed for the CloudIoT platform [34, 33].
In [35], Alphand et al. propose a blockchain security architecture for IoT named IoTChain. In this
work, the secure authorized access to IoT resources is ensured by a combination of the ACE authorization
framework [36] and the OSCAR architecture [37]. IoTChain replaces the single ACE authorization server
by the blockchain to make the ACE authorization phase flexible and trustless. The feasibility of IoTChain
is evaluated through an implemented authorization blockchain on top of a private Ethereum network. Dinu
et al. [38] introduced a software benchmarking framework for the consistent evaluation of lightweight block
ciphers on three different platforms, namely 32-bit ARM, 16-bit MSP430 and 8-bit AVR. Recently, a Novel
Tiny Symmetric encryption Algorithm (NTSA) has been presented in [39]. NTSA proposes to enhance the
text file transfer security through the IoT network by introducing additional key confusions dynamically for
each round of encryption.
2.3. Summary and contribution
As a conclusion, all these works might provide a satisfying solution to secure the communication. How-
ever, there are still some inherent limitations in terms of efficiency, scalability and access control, which make
them not suitable for constrained IoT devices. Therefore, there has been a growing demand for efficient
lightweight encryption mechanisms that combine all the features of lightweight symmetric and asymmetric
algorithms [28]. Furthermore, these mechanisms should be able to provide mutual lightweight authentica-
tion for secure access control and authentication between users and devices in an IoT environment. In this
paper, we will design and implement a lightweight encryption technique, which is targeted to define a secure
information exchange by considering the encountered limitations. To this end, an autonomous and secure
exchange of confidential information in the IoT context is required in regard to the nature of the connected
entities and their real environment. The proposed technique focuses on distributed architecture networks
with the aim to ensure a high security on the basis of a dynamic topology.
6











































Figure 3: A Secure protocol stack for IoT.
3. Architectural concept
In this section, we present the main requirements for a secure information exchange that considers the
limitations of IoT devices. Then we describe the proposed architecture that addresses these requirements.
Our work focuses on distributed architecture networks with the aim to ensure an adapted security level with
dynamic architecture topology. The reason behind flat and distributed network architectures is to adapt
to the nature of IoT networks, where several entities of connected devices may autonomously and securely
exchange confidential information.
A sustainable IoT architecture cannot be achievable without protecting the information, either during the
transmission or the storage. The main tasks here are protection and management. Figure 3 shows a secure
IoT management stack that contains two sub-stacks, IoT having a layered communication protocol as shown
in the right sub-stack, that allows an enormous number of objects to get connected through the internet.
These layers are to fulfill the IoT network limitations and needs. Suitable activity scenarios could be reached
when the second sub-stack is accompanied by the first. That explains why the security paradigm of IoT
network architectures becomes one of the most indispensable elements. Therefore, lightweight computation
modules, such as simple permutation functions and bit-wise exclusive-or operation, are required in the design
of secure transmission for each proposed protocol. To this end, we propose in this work a flexible encryption
technique, called FlexenTech, that provides an acceptable security level with respect to IoT limitations and
requirements.
Table 1 contains the abbreviations used in this paper together with a brief explanation to speed up the
reading and ease the understanding of its content.
The proposed technique was designed with the following goals in mind:
• the technique should be a symmetric block cipher. The same secret cryptographic key (key = K) is
used for encryption and for decryption. The plain data and cipher data are fixed-length bit sequences
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Acronym Definition
K is the secret Key, each pair of entities asymmetrically shares the same secret number called K.
B plain or ciphered data Block size in term of bits.
Vi represents the calculated Value for the i
th bit position.
rnd is the number of rounds that will be used in a given configuration.
r the current round.
str means the reversing start bit position from which the next bits will automatically be reversed.
Table 1: List of used acronyms
(block size = B).
• it should be suitable for low resource hardware. This means that the proposed technique should use
only primitive computational operations.
• it should be adaptable to devices of different data-lengths. Accordingly, the number B of bits in a
data is a parameter of our proposed technique; different choices of this parameter can be used.
• it should be iterative in structure, with a variable number of rounds. The number of rounds is a
second parameter as shown in our architecture (Figure 4). The user can explicitly maintain the trade-
off between high speed and high security.
• it should be simple and easy to implement. It is more important to use a simple structure as illustrated
in Algorithm 1, with the aim to easily implement it. Furthermore, a simple scheme is perhaps more
interesting to analyze and evaluate, so that the cryptographic strength can be more rapidly determined.
3.1. The proposed IoT encryption architecture
There are several emerging areas where highly constrained devices are interconnected to accomplish some
tasks. These constrained devices (IoT) aim to communicate and make decisions over many low resources
and capacities. To an efficient use goal, the designed conceptual model illustrated in Figure 4 shows the
complexity space of the proposed technique in view of the security requirements such as confidentiality,
integrity and signature. The efficiency of FlexenTech resides on the choice of B and rnd, where its flexibility
offers a complete freedom to the user for weighing between the complexity and the security level. In
heterogeneous environments, the FlexenTech encryption mode can respond to many challenges and issues
like power consumption of devices, limited battery, memory space, performance cost, and security.
The proposed technique focuses on three parameters to encrypt/decrypt the information:













Figure 4: A conceptual representation of FlexenTech in view of the complexity space (Block Size, Round).
• A number of rounds should be carried out before achieving the final encrypted information.
• In each given round i, a random rotation will be applied to the information obtained from the previous
round i− 1.
The proposed architecture performs a set of random permutations, substitutions and rotations at the
bit level to encrypt the plaintext. The permutations and substitutions are done using the modular function
with the following steps:
• The size of the information to be encrypted is pre-configured with a given block size called B (in terms
of number of bits).
• Using one of the proposed key management schemes, such as Self-VKS [40], the entities may securely
share a given large number K. We note that B and K should verify the conditions gcd 1(K,B) = 1
and K > B.
• The node uses Equation (1) to make a random permutation at the bit level of the plain information
that will be sent. Figure 5 shows an example that explains how this equation produces random bit
permutations.
• It is possible to construct lightweight hash functions with the aim to ensure a substitution based on
local variable values. Since the modulus operation provides a new random i′ for each given i, all bits
between the str bit position and the B bit position will be reversed. Hence, this situation means that
1gcd(K,B) means the greatest common divisor of K and B
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1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0
161 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Plain Data
Vi = ( B ⨉ ( K – i ) ) mod N
B = 16
K = 101





Random Vi 4785 69 53 37 21 5 90 74 58 42 26 10 95 79 63
136 12 5 11 4 10 16 3 9 15 2 8 14 1 7
Ordered Vi 955 10 21 26 37 42 47 53 58 63 69 74 79 85 90
Figure 5: A demonstrative example of FlexenTech’s permutation.
the content value of a given bit i will automatically be reversed if str ≤ i ≤ B. Otherwise, the content
value will not be changed as shown in the example of Figure 7.
The key principle behind FlexenTech is that by securely sharing any given large number K, the entities
can generate a set of B random values which will be used to encrypt and decrypt the exchanged information.
The permutation of the bits is based on Equation (1).
Vi = (B × (K − i)) mod K (1)
where i = 1, 2 . . . B and Vi represents the obtained value for the i
th bit position in the message of size B.
Hereafter, the values of Vi will be ascendingly ordered with the aim to set up a random bit permutation.
Every bit i will be permuted to its new position i′ depending on the position of Vi in the ascendingly
ordered list. To ensure that every bit will be permuted, the value of K should be selected in such a way
that gcd(K,B) = 1. Figure 5 shows an example of the proposed technique, where the entities securely
share K = 101 and the size of the data is configured to B = 16. On the other hand, the destination node
reconstructs the original information by applying Equation (1) on the received data to resubmit every bit
on its right position.
3.2. The proposed FlexenTech encryption algorithm with recursive rounds
The resource consumption of the proposed security protocol must be lightweight in terms of communi-
cation, memory usage and computation. To make sure that the proposed protocol is feasible and practical,
it should add a communication overhead as small as possible and have low memory consumption and low
CPU workload. Therefore, an efficient encryption mechanism has been adopted. The instructions for use
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Block size  
B Parity 
Plain Data 
Rotation + Permutation  
Encryption 1 
Rotation + Permutation  
Output 
str (B, K, r, Nonce) Round, r =1 
str (B, K, r, Nonce) Round, r =2 
Encryption n-2 
Rotation + Permutation  
str (B, K, r, Nonce) Round, r =n-1 
Encryption n-1 
Rotation + Permutation  
str (B, K, r, Nonce) Round, r =n 
Encryption n 
Cipher Data 
   . . . x1 xn-1 x2 xn 
   . . . x1 xn-1 x2 xn 
   . . . x1 xn-1 x2 xn 
   . . . x1 xn-1 x2 xn 
   . . . x1 xn-1 x2 xn 
Figure 6: General structure of FlexenTech.
of this mechanism are shown in Figure 6, where a set of rounds, performing the same operations over the
obtained encrypted information, should be applied before obtaining the final encrypted information. On the
other hand, the proposed technique focuses on a configurable security threshold which defines the preferred
security level of the communication. The security threshold is the number of required rounds to cipher
a plain data. Additionally, a given threshold determines the overload size that will be added in terms of
the number of additional bits to ensure data integrity and signature. Furthermore, before maintaining any
round, a random rotation is performed, where the start bit of the rotation is computed by Equation (2).
On the other hand, the parameter number of rounds is considered as the security level because it implies
immediately the similarity rate between plain and ciphered text, the computation time, and usually an
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additional overload.
str = (K × (r + Nonce)) mod B (2)
where str is the rotation start bit of a given round r and Nonce is a nonce, or could be a counter, which is
used with the aim to reduce playback attacks. Figure 7 shows a clear example of the ciphering steps with a
security level rnd = 4.
In the following, we explain how the proposed algorithm is applied within an IoT environment. For
descriptive purposes, Algorithm 1 uses some terms defined in modular computation. An originator device
prepares messages with the use of this algorithm in order to protect the data. The private data are the value
of K and the secret information. The value of the data size, the used Nonce and the security level, i.e.,
the number of rounds, can be used as public variables. The encryption table is defined to ensure a random
permutation. Its size equals 3×B, where the first row contains the values of Vi. The second and third rows
are to save the original and the new bit position, respectively, after sorting the Vi values. For more details,
FlexenTech.c 1 shows the C code of the example illustrated in Figure 7.
3.3. Analysis of the proposed encryption algorithm
The efficiency of any cryptographic protocol focusing on any algebraic structure depends on factors such
as: parameter size, time-memory tradeoffs, available processing power, software and/or hardware optimiza-
tion, and mathematical algorithms. Therefore, when designing the proposed technique we have taken into
account the primary concerns to use powerful and efficient mathematical operations and algorithms which
quickly carry out computations respecting at the same time the occurred overhead and the used memory
storage. Several hash and encryption functions or digital signature schemes require computations in Zm, the
integers modulo m (m is a large positive integer which may or may not be a prime). Zm is exploited in many
contexts of modern applied cryptography. In this section, we discuss the requirements and the complexity
of the proposed technique. We also discuss efficient methods that can be used to perform addition and
multiplication in Zm.
As the designed technique is bit-oriented, all of the basic computational operations have B−bit as inputs
and outputs. Hence, the technique is a block-cipher with a one-word of B bit input (plainData) block size
and a one-word (cipherData) output block size. The choice for B is not limited to such values. Therefore,
the technique is well-defined for any B > 0, although for strong encryption and more efficiency it is proposed
to use a large value of B. We note that there is no limit for the values of B and K [41], but the relation
between them should verify gcd(K,B) = 1 to ensure that
B × i mod K 6= 0 ∀ i ∈ {1, 2, . . . B} (3)
Lemma 1. For i ∈ {1, . . . B} let Vi ∈ Zk with K > 0. If B is relatively prime to K, then the congruence
B × i ≡ Vi (mod k) has a solution i; moreover, any integer i′ is a solution if and only if i ≡ i′ (mod K).
12
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0
161 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Plain Data




1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1
i
136 12 5 11 4 10 16 3 9 15 2 8 14 1 7i’
Vi
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 10 1 0
161 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
4785 69 53 37 21 5 90 74 58 42 26 10 95 79 63
1





str = (K ⨉ ( r + Nonce)) mod B
(a) Pre-configuration and steps to obtain the first round.
161 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
i
i’
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 01 0 1
161 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
4785 69 53 37 21 5 90 74 58 42 26 10 95 79 63
Encryption 1




136 12 5 11 4 10 16 3 9 15 2 8 14 1 7
Round 2,  Rotation st2 = 9
Vi
(b) Steps to obtain the second round.
161 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1
i
i’
1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 10 1 0
161 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
4785 69 53 37 21 5 90 74 58 42 26 10 95 79 63
Encryption 2




136 12 5 11 4 10 16 3 9 15 2 8 14 1 7
Round 3,  Rotation st3 = 14
Vi
(c) Steps to obtain the third round.
161 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15




0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 01 1 0
161 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
4785 69 53 37 21 5 90 74 58 42 26 10 95 79 63
0 1 0 1
0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0
Encryption 3
0 1 0 1
Encryption 4
Parity
136 12 5 11 4 10 16 3 9 15 2 8 14 1 7
Vi
Round 4,  Rotation st4 = 3
(d) Steps to obtain the fourth round and the final ciphered
data.
Figure 7: A FlexenTech encryption example with four rounds.
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Algorithm 1 Encryption and Decryption FlexenTech algorithm.
Require: Private: K, plainData;
Require: Public: B, Nonce, rnd, mode, cipheredData;
Ensure: data; . data here means plainData or cipheredData which is tied to the encryption mode.
1: Temporal: table[3][B];
2: Constant: V = 0, orgPos = 1, newPos = 2;
3: for (i ∈ [0, B − 1]) do
4: table[V ][i]← (B × (K − i)) mod K;
5: table[orgPos][i]← i . numbering the bit positions
6: end for
7: table← sortingTable(table)
8: if mode = encrypt then
9: cipheredData← plainData
10: for r ∈ [1, rnd] do
11: str ← (K × (r + Nonce)) mod B
12: cipheredData← rightRotation(cipheredData, str);
13: cipheredData← reverse(cipheredData, str);
14: parityBit(cipheredData, str);




19: if mode = decrypt then
20: plainData← cipheredData
21: for r ∈ [1, rnd] do
22: plainData← RandomPermutation(table, plainData);
23: str ← (K × (r + Nonce)) mod B
24: plainData← reverse(plainData, str);
25: parityBit(plainData, str);










2: for (i ∈ [0, B − 1]) do . Sorting table depending on Vi values and moving their bit positions
3: for j ∈ [i + 1, B − 1] do
4: if (table[V][i] > table[V][j]) then
5: temp← table[V ][i];
6: table[V ][i]← table[V ][j];







14: for (i ∈ [0, B − 1]) do . inserting the new bit positions
15: for j ∈ [0, B − 1] do







Proof. The integer i = Vi × B′, where B′ is a multiplicative inverse of a modulo K, is clearly a solution.
For any integer i′, we have B × i′ ≡ Vi (mod K) if and only if B × i′ ≡ B × i (mod K) which holds if and
only if i ≡ i′ (mod K).
Suppose that B, Vi,K ∈ Z with K > 0, B 6= 0, and gcd(B,K) = 1. This theorem says that there exists
unique integers i and j satisfying: B × i ≡ Vi (mod K), B × j ≡ Vj (mod K), and Vi 6= Vj if i 6= j with
0 ≤ i, j < K. In the proposed technique we avoid the value i = 0 to ensure a full bit permutation.
We observe that any value of i that verifies (B × i) < K, the congruence modulo K equals to B × i (i.e.,
B× i ≡ B× i (mod K)). This situation leads to generate some ordered Vi values. Following to the principle
of the proposed technique, ordered values of Vi means encrypting data with weak permutation. For example,
by using K = 101 and B = 16 on Figure 5, Vi will be [16, 32, 48, 64, 80, 96, 11, 27, 43, 59, 75, 91, 6, 22, 38, 54]
when we use i = {1, 2, . . . 16} in Equation (3). The values that are in ascendant order (here there are three
waves of ordered values: [16 – 96], [11 – 91] and [6 – 54]) will minimize the randomization of the permutation
phase of the encryption process. In order to avoid these values, we let run i from K − 1 until K − B as
shown in Equation (1). Vi values will then determine the bit permutation of plain data as shown by the
example presented in Figure 5
An analysis shows that the total number of ordered compositions of Vi that can be obtained by using
different values of K equals B!. Then, in the aim to reduce brute force attacks, the size of the data to be
encrypted should be configured in such a way that B! ≈ +∞. As a result, the strength of the proposed
technique is relatively proportional to the size of B in terms of bits, where there is no restriction concerning
the preferred size of K. The computation task of checking gcd(K,B) = 1 can be avoided if the used size of
B is a prime number, case in which any value of K will verify gcd(K,B) = 1. Choosing a prime number B
will help us to minimize the computation and to avoid repute computation in case that gcd(K,B) 6= 1. The
process of sharing securely the same value of K between two or more devices can be reached by using one
of the known algorithms, for instance the asymmetric key sharing algorithm or a pre-configured symmetric
key sharing scheme. On the other hand, the number rnd of rounds is the second parameter. Choosing a
large number of rounds presumably provides an increased level of security. We note here that the number of
rounds depends on the desired security level and the supplied size of B. However, choosing a large number
of rounds also implies a need for more memory and computation time. The analysis of the example shown in
Figure 7 says that a brute force attack may find the original data from the used permutation at a maximum
of 16! tests. The speed of growth of the factorial function offers a great advantage to reduce brute force
attacks.
In the proposed technique we use two kinds of permutation: the first is by ordering the values of Vi
and the second is achieved from the rotation. However, the technique still needs a substitution function
to avoid frequency analysis attacks. Therefore, we have reversed all bits starting from str until the B-bit
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position. Hence, the value of str can be exploited for multiple uses: it offers a random permutation in each
round, ensures the bit substitutions and extracts the integrity bits. The integrity is ensured by computing
the parity of bits before starting the permutation. In FlexenTech, the size of parity bits equals rnd and
the receiver detects any change on one bit by comparing the parity bits of the obtained plain data with
the right bit of the integrity bits. Otherwise, changing even bits will not be detected in the obtained plain
data. This change can be detected in the next rounds. The integrity is ensured by satisfying the condition
of preventing the bits change in case that an even number of changed bits are still in the same part, i.e.,
in the reversed bits part or in the other part. Hence, the number of rounds has a straight impact on data
integrity strength.
Let P be the probability to make a change on some bits over the ciphered data that generate the same
parity bits. The value of P is related to the size of parity bits, i.e., the number of rounds, and the value of
Nonce.
In this technique, an attacker can falsify the data without any change at the parity bits level only when
the falsified bits meet the following two conditions:
1. Falsifying an even number of bits situated in the reversed part, i.e., between [str, B];
2. Each round contains an even number of falsified bits in the reversed part.
The first condition seems easy to be met, but each pair of falsified bits should be situated on the same
side (either on the reversed or on the unreversed bits side) for every round. Hence, the second condition
says that the data integrity of FlexenTech depends on the size of the parity bits, i.e., the number of rounds.
Then, the probability P of an attacker to falsify e bits (e being an even number) of the ciphered data without




× str − 1
B − 1
× . . . str − e− 1




× B − str − 1
B − 1
· · · × B − str − e− 1
B − e− 1
(4)
with total probability P = P e1 × P e2 . . . P ernd .
Equation (4) says that there are two probabilities of successful falsifications. The first probability could
be obtained when the falsification has been made over the unreversed side and these falsified bits are still
on the same side for each round. The same holds for the second probability, but the falsification has been
made over the reversed bits side. Hence, we observe that the number of rounds has an important impact on
the probability to succeed in falsifying the ciphered data.
3.4. Discussion
We divide the discussion into two parts: 1) Choosing the adequate key establishment algorithm to
securely compute the shared key (i.e., K). 2) The robustness and efficiency of this technique to cope with
the most known attacks.
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3.4.1. Key establishment algorithm
Key establishment is the most fundamental cryptographic primitive in all types of applications. How-
ever, the nature of such connected devices limits the use of conventional key establishment techniques. Many
researchers have proposed to use symmetric key pre-distribution schemes for the key establishment objec-
tive [40, 42]. These schemes consider the resource limitation, the communication capability and the compu-
tation speed [43]. However, symmetric schemes often have a centralized aspect, focus on pre-configuration
and define a pool key principle which leads us to exploit asymmetric key establishment schemes [44]. The
authors of [45] benchmark some public key protocols that are usually used for a symmetric key agreement to
determine the most appropriate for the requirements of critical infrastructure and emergency applications.
Based on these algorithms, the analysis shows that there are remarkable performance benefits with the
Curve25519, especially FourQ [46] which uses the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman scheme.
In the proposed protocol, we use FourQ which is a new elliptic curve algorithm released by Microsoft
Research in 2015. FourQ is not used yet in standard or known protocols. Technically, FourQ targets
the 128 bit security level and its high performance is mainly obtained from the decomposition of the total
number of the elliptic curve group operations and fast arithmetic modulo computation using the Mersenne
prime p = 2127 − 1. In term of speed, FourQ uses the endomorphisms to accelerate scalar multiplications
via four-dimensional decompositions, where the computation of scalar multiplications is significantly faster
than all known curve-based cryptographic primitives.
3.4.2. FlexenTech’s robustness and efficiency
During the development of the FlexenTech encryption technique, we began to focus our attention on
how to find adequate solutions to the encountered IoT issues by taking into account the designed technique
that should additionally provide a high-security level when suitable parameters are assigned. Our technique
demonstrates its robustness and efficiency by providing data encryption, data integrity and data freshness,
as will be explained below.
Encryption. The proposed technique converts a plain text into a ciphered text with the same text size B.
Furthermore, the proposed technique considers permutation and substitution to avoid frequency cryptanal-
ysis attacks. That means that the obtained ciphered text has no trace or information related to the original
text. In computation and efficiency terms, the proposed technique needs only simple operations in order to
encrypt a text with a given key K by computing B values of Vi and ordering them. In each round, the bits
of the input text should be rotated starting from str, ordered with respect to Vi values and reversing the
bits that are on the right side of str, see Figure 7(a). The key restriction here is that the value of K should
be greater than B which offers a large pool of keys and ensures flexible key configurations. This encryption
mechanism offers a pool of size B!−B.
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Data integrity. The integrity approaches aim to detect the alteration in the data that will be sent. Any even
slight modification should be of effect on the integrity bits. In the decryption phase, the authorized entity
has to check a possible alternation by computing the parity bit of the bits that are listed on the right side of
str, then compare it with the originally received bit in each round. This technique is powerful for detecting
the integrity of data during the data decryption, i.e., we do not need to execute an additional separated
task. Furthermore, it is possible to detect a data alteration before obtaining the plain text. In fact, this
principle will offer a significant reduction in term of computation. On the other hand, such applications
request to hide the integrity bits in the ciphered data which is easily reached in our proposed technique by
computing the r next Vi values (Vr+1, Vr+2 . . . Vr+B) under the condition that K > (r + B). The parity
bits and the ciphered data can then be encrypted in an additional round.
3.5. Data freshness
The importance of data freshness is increasing, especially in the domain of distributed smart networks
which are composed of a large-scale set of autonomous data sources. The use of the encrypted data with
same freshness may lead to unauthorized access problems. In fact, data freshness is indispensable in Wireless
Sensor Networks, IoT and other domains, to reduce various types of attacks such as replay attacks and
extraction of some confidential information from the encrypted data. At the same time, we have to be
interested in the overall generated overhead in order to ensure data freshness. In this paper, we propose
an efficient technique to ensure the data freshness by using a Nonce during the data encryption/decryption
phases, where the used Nonce has no restriction in term of size. The way to avoid the augmentation of the
overhead is to introduce the Nonce to compute the rotation in each round. In fact, by using this principle
the following services can be ensured:
• Data freshness is ensured without any additional overhead. However, the entities publicly share the
used Nonce.
• Encapsulating the whole encrypted data, that will be sent, allows to distinguish ciphered text from
the same plain data by using a different Nonce value in each case.
• A large counter size is useful to be used as a Nonce in order to encrypt data with different counter
values, i.e., for each secret K the counter can be used 2x times, where x is the Nonce size in terms of
bits.
The data freshness offers many other services and advantages mainly in real-time applications including
e-commerce, sensor data fusion, traffic control, and monitoring. To reach this aim, the data freshness process
of this technique focuses on the communication speed, where no overhead is added. The proposed technique
gives a configurable range of parameter values so that user devices may run the encryption algorithm
19
whose security and speed are accepted for their application. Unlike several encryption techniques, which
have no parameterization and hence no flexibility, the proposed encryption algorithm permits upgrades as
necessary. The choice of r affects both encryption speed and security. For some domains, real-time may be
the most critical requirement. This kind of application looks for the best security obtainable within a given
encryption time requirement. Choosing a small value of rnd (say rnd = 4) may provide some security, albeit
modest, within the given speed constraint. The size overhead is critical, because it immediately affects the
communication speed and the lifetime of connected devices, as well as the packet loss rate caused by packet
collisions.
4. Implementation and results
This section gives the experimental setup details used in the evaluation of FlexenTechit’s reconfiguration
flexibility. FlexenTech uses a pseudo random number as a key for encryption and decryption. It completes
the rnd rounds of encryption on each B bits block of data. In all rounds, encryption is done using a function
that ensures an irregular rotation. Furthermore, each round increases the number of integrity bits. With
any unfixed parameter, the encryption strength of FlexenTech is directly tied to the predefined parameters
during its execution. FlexenTech gives its users the ability to balance the weighing between encryption
computational complexity, security level, and data load; specifically, users can adjust encryption speed,
key setup time, and code size to balance performance. This makes FlexenTech suitable for application on
resource constrained embedded devices.
FlexenTech is easy to implement efficiently in most common programming languages. For evaluation
purposes, FlexenTech was coded in C (source code available from2). This implementation follows accu-
rately the specifications given in Section 3.2 to generate the encryption example shown in Figure 7. The
performance analysis evaluates the effect of the rnd and B parameters as a function of the computation
time. Since the study relies on the development of a lightweight encryption technique for IoT systems, the
proposed technique will be implemented and verified in two environments with the following specifications:
Raspberry Pi 3 Model B :
– CPU: Quad-Core 1.2GHz Broadcom BCM2837 64bit, ARM Cortex-A53 (ARMv8)
– RAM 1GB
– Raspbian is the official operating system
– Geany GCC c/c++ compiler
Laptop Acer Aspire E1-571 :
2https://github.com/smedileh/FlexenTech/blob/master/FlexenTech.c
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– CPU: Intel Core i5-3230M 3rd Gen, 2.60 GHz Dual-core, HM77 Express
– RAM 8GB
– Windows 10 operating system
– Geany GCC c/c++ compiler
In the following subsections, we describe each experiment and present and analyse its results.
4.1. Number of Round
This experiment investigates the impact of changing rnd on FlexenTech’s performance. Figures 8(a)
and 8(c) plots rnd against the running time on both the Raspberry Pi device and the Acer laptop. The
block size is fixed to 16 through all runs. As observed from Figure 8(a), when rnd = 4 the running time in
the laptop does not exceed 0.25 ns. Hereafter, when rnd is increased to 8, the running time is propoertioally
doubled to reach 0.5 ns. The same trend is observed consistently with other parameters, meaning that
the time increases approximately by a factor of two. Similar performance is observed on the Raspberry Pi
device. Figure 8(c) shows that the running time on the Raspberry Pi device continues to increase as rnd
increases.
4.2. Block Size
The experimental results illustrated in Figures 8(b) and 8(d) study the impact of the used block size on
the encryption time and complexity. In these experiments, the rnd is fixed to 16 while varying the block
size to 16, 32, 64, 128, 256 and 512. Figure 8(b) shows that, when the block size is as small as 16 bits,
the running time does not exceed 0.35 ns. When the block size is fixed to 32 and 64 bits the running time
increases by a factor of 2 with a time of about 0.75 and 1.85 ns, respectively. When the block size is set
to 128 bits the running time does not increase as much and stands at 2.1 ns. However, when the block size
increases to 256 and 512 bits, the running time increases significantly to about 180%. This increase in the
running time is caused by the time consumed by the sorting function in Algorithm 1 (see line 9). Figure 8(d)
shows similar performance is on the Raspberry Pi.
4.3. Comparative Performance Analysis
In this section we compare FlexenTech’s encryption time with some common symmetric encryption
techniques, namely FlexenTech, RC5, Blowfish and AES. Figure 9 shows the encryption speed of FlexenTech
against these symmetric techniques running on the Acer laptop. We observe that FlexenTech outperforms
both AES and Blowfish, and performs comparably to RC5 and FlexenTech. Similar to FlexenTech, RC5 and


























(a) Running time of the personal computer as a function of











































(c) Running time of the Raspberry Pi device as a function of























(d) Running time of the Raspberry Pi device as a function of
the block size.
Figure 8: Running time as a function of the number of rounds and the block size.
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Figures 10 and 11 show the encryption processing time on a Raspberry Pi device. We observe in Figure 10
that FlexenTech is faster than RC5 while providing good security level when using block size smaller than 64
bits, whereas RC5 provides security only if predefined suitable parameters are chosen. The security of RC5
depends on the size of the used key, which is stronger for a larger key size. Hence, FlexenTech is more
efficient and flexible in term of the used block size.
We also studied the encryption processing time as a function of the number of rounds. Figure 11 shows
that RC5 performs better if rnd > 8. However, FlexenTech still gives a reasonable encryption processing
time even if rnd < 32. Due to the random permutations at the bit level of the plaintext, it is possible to
use FlexenTech with one round to encrypt securely. Therefore, 4 rounds are largely enough in FlexenTech,
whereas 12 rounds are required in RC5.
In terms of reconfiguration flexibility, Simon and Speck cryptographic schemes are designed with leveled
flexibility allowing some different key and block sizes. Speck contains 10 variants where the block size is 32,
48, 64, 96 or 128 bits, and the key size is 64, 72, 96, 128, 144, 192 or 256 bits and the number of rounds
depends on the parameters selected. Speck gets its nonlinearity from the modular addition operation;
it has been demonstrated that key lengths below 80 bits do not provide a high level of security. When
SIMON is executed on an 8-bit AVR microcontroller, Speck encryption with 64-bit blocks and a 128-bit key
consumes 192 bytes of the Flash memory, temporary variables consume 112 bytes of RAM, takes 164 cycles
to encrypt each byte in the block, and the Attacked Rounds/Total Rounds percentage ranges between 53%
and 74%; however, reduced-round variants have been successfully compromised.
The Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA) cipher focuses on Feistel iterations by using 64-bit size blocks
(32 bit words) and a 128-bit key (divided into 4 parts) where odd rounds use K[0; 1] and even rounds use
K[2; 3]. With the use of 32 cycles (64 rounds ), the designers of TEA argue that 16 cycles may suffice
but they suggest 32 cycles with the use of the constant ”C” (used to prevent simple attacks based on the
symmetry of the rounds). There are successful attacks on TEA with 17 rounds because TEA is susceptible
to related-key attack which arise from the simplicity of its key schedule [47].
We summarise the performance of FlexenTech against of theses ciphers in Table 3. Overall, the secu-
rity performance of block ciphers depends on the used block size, key size and number of rounds. Other
encryption techniques prefer a large block size for faster execution due to the time spend in the cipher ini-
tialisation. Moreover, large keys result in lower computation time, because all bits of the key are involved in
an execution cycle of the encryption. FlexenTech offers a major advantage by allowing efficient encryption
using only one single round. Another advantage of FlexenTech is its reduced complexity, i.e., the key has
two parts where the first is static and used once for the random permutation for all rounds, and the second
is dynamic requiring its specific computation in each round to compute the start bit rotation. The static
part of the key reduces computation cost, memory utilisation and energy consumption, which is of particular


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 10: The execution time as a function of the block size.
5. Conclusion and future work
Nowadays, the main security challenge in the IoT environment is the design of efficient and lightweight
encryption techniques in regard to resource limitations of connected devices. In this paper, we have pro-
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Figure 11: The execution time as a function of the number of rounds.
these devices more applicable in terms of security requirements. The mechanism of the proposed technique
reduces the computation time incurred by data transmission, because we have minimized the number of
rounds used to cipher the information and introduced many improvements to minimize computation. Re-
ducing computation time offers a remarkable benefit in term of energy consumption of the autonomous IoT
devices [57]. The implementation of FlexenTech upon low-end IoT devices shows its practical flexibility.
This flexibility enables the choice of a minimal number of rounds and a smaller overhead size which leads
to an improvement in encryption time without reducing security levels. The obtained enhancement on the
encryption time decreases many risks of such attacks. A security analysis of the proposed technique also
shows its configuration flexibility and feasibility in terms of limited resource consumption and low execution
time.
In future research, we intend to evaluate FlexenTech on various IoT hardware platforms in different
application scenarios that require various levels of security. This allows studying the configuration flexibility
and security of FlexenTech under real-life conditions exposing potential practical technical issues that may
hinder its application. In parallel to practical evaluation, we plan to formally model and analyse FlexenTech
to prove its properties using SPIN model checker or similar tool. Another interesting future work avenue is
to investigate the possibility to adapt this principle of FlexenTech to the use for cloud storage.
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tional chaos based-cryptosystem for generating encryption keys in ad hoc networks,” Ad Hoc Networks, vol. 97, p. 102005,
2020.
[30] S. Belguith, N. Kaaniche, and G. Russello, “Pu-abe: Lightweight attribute-based encryption supporting access policy
update for cloud assisted iot,” in 2018 IEEE 11th International Conference on Cloud Computing (CLOUD). IEEE,
2018, pp. 924–927.
[31] S. Moffat, M. Hammoudeh, and R. Hegarty, “A survey on ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (cp-abe) approaches
to data security on mobile devices and its application to iot,” in Proceedings of the International Conference on Future
Networks and Distributed Systems. ACM, 2017, p. 34.
[32] S. Al Salami, J. Baek, K. Salah, and E. Damiani, “Lightweight encryption for smart home,” in 2016 11th International
Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES). IEEE, 2016, pp. 382–388.
[33] J. Li, Y. Zhang, J. Ning, X. Huang, G. S. Poh, and D. Wang, “Attribute based encryption with privacy protection and
accountability for cloudiot,” IEEE Transactions on Cloud Computing, 2020.
[34] S. Belguith, N. Kaaniche, G. Russello et al., “Lightweight attribute-based encryption supporting access policy update for
cloud assisted iot,” in Proceedings of the 15th International Joint Conference on e-Business and Telecommunications-
Volume 1: SECRYPT. SciTePress, 2018, pp. 135–146.
[35] O. Alphand, M. Amoretti, T. Claeys, S. Dall’Asta, A. Duda, G. Ferrari, F. Rousseau, B. Tourancheau, L. Veltri, and
F. Zanichelli, “Iotchain: A blockchain security architecture for the internet of things,” in 2018 IEEE Wireless Communi-
cations and Networking Conference (WCNC). IEEE, 2018, pp. 1–6.
[36] L. Seitz, G. Selander, E. Wahlstroem, S. Erdtman, and H. Tschofenig, “Authentication and authorization for constrained
environments (ace),” Internet Engineering Task Force, 2017.
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